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


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
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THE BAROMETER is a student bi-weekly newspaper for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. Items of interest, papers, and articles of interest to the students, staff, and faculty as a whole are solicited.

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"As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the superstructure, is radically marred and imperfect if the foundation be insecure-so, if the strategy be wrong the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect." MAHAN, Naval Administration and Warfare, 1908

EDITORIAL COMMENT: The following excerpts were taken from the recently completed Naval Officer Professional Development Study headed by Vice Admiral M. G. Bayne. The first selection is an open letter to all officers concerning professional development. The second selection is a letter from Admiral Hyman Rickover expressing his views on professional development. The BAROMETER urges all of its readers to scrutinize both of these articles carefully. In our opinion this may be the most significant, and thought provoking reading, you may do at the Postgraduate School.

NOTES ON CAREER PLANNING FOR ALL NAVAL OFFICERS:

"This open letter, intended to be read by all officers of the Navy at any stage in their careers, discusses the various decision points faced by a Navy professional as attempts are made to match personal interests with Navy needs. At several career points the officer must come to a conscious judgment regarding the career path to be sought; the assignments to be requested, and the training or education required to fulfill the chosen career path. These decisions are not all clearly visible. They are not driven by a series of career qualifications which can be checked off, and so insure promotability or even assignability. Just as is true in all other professions, they require an intelligent blending of past experience, developed equity and interest in the mission of the organization, loyalty to the profession and advice from informed sources in the naval establishment. These sources include commanding officers, career counselors, detailers and professional literature. The blend gradually into a decision which at the career point in question is the best judgment to be made at that time to satisfy the needs of the Navy and interests of the officer. Where these two factors are in complete harmony, professional success is always assured. Where they differ, compromises must be made.

It is essential that the career officer understand that these compromises cannot be weighed too heavily in favor of individual desires. The needs of the Service, its personnel constraints, the billets to be filled, the fact that the Service is mission-oriented; all are necessary ingredients of this understanding. The word 'Service' is the key. A professional naval officer serves the country and the Navy. The country and the Navy serve the officer, but only to the degree that they sense the officer's higher order of service in the first place.

This priority of responsibility in Service is sometimes misunderstood in today's modern society. For the military professional to misunderstand it will result in lack of professional contribution and consequently diminution of success. It is necessary, then, that the officer's career be developed along lines of, first, determining personal basic interests which match best the needs of the Service; second, fortifying by training and education those interests to the best of his or her ability, and third, seeking opportunities to serve in areas which allow these fortified abilities to be best utilized.

We speak here of a commissioned officer who has entered the Navy from the Naval Academy or a civilian academic source, who has a baccalaureate degree and has not rejected the notion that the Navy is a possible career.

As an Ensign there is the immediate basic decision as to specialty. The officer must decide whether personal interests lie in service in the operational or the support areas of the Navy. If the choice is the unrestricted line (URL), the officer faces a further choice as to warfare specialty: surface, air or subsurface. If the choice is in the support area, a further choice must then be made, involving the area in which service is desired. In selecting a support path, the officer automatically further chooses to serve in a managerial or technical role rather than an operational command role.

As in all future decisions, the area of first preference may not be available. If it is, the path for a period of time is easily determined by the training received afloat in warfare specialty training, or ashore in school, or on the job. If the officer is not accepted in the area of first choice, he or she faces, as always, the question, 'Are my interests in the Navy based solely on acceptance into a particular program, or is some alternate program compatible with my goals?'

In whatever specialty chosen or accepted, the officer receives necessary basic training and experience in this specialty, and as he or she acquires experience, equity and interest in that specialty develop.

At the junior grade lieutenant, or lieutenant grade level again the officer is faced with identifying interests, this time terms of possible education. At this point, through counseling, official notices, talks with other officers, and discussions with commanding officers concerning options available, a realization will occur that there are a number of interesting billets within the Navy which require education above the baccalaureate. These billets number between five and six thousand and require a base of ten to twelve thousand specially educated officers to keep them filled. Some academic disciplines required in these billets are more popular than others. In these, more officers exist with the necessary education than there are billets to fill, and in the less popular areas, there are billets requiring advanced education with an insufficient number of officers to fill them. Generally, the technical academic disciplines such as aero engineering, ship engineering and computer technology are less likely to have a plentiful supply of educated officers than are the billets requiring advanced education in management, the social sciences, international relations or political science. Again a decision is necessary.

If the officer's undergraduate educational experience has been rewarding, if the energy, ability, and interest to seek graduate education is highly developed, and if there interests match the Navy's advanced education needs, the officer may expect to be selected for fully funded study in one of these disciplines. If not selected for graduate education on a fully funded basis, again a decision must be made. There are two options available: To seek graduate education (in an off-duty status) on own time or to forego graduate education as a dispensable item. In making this decision the officer should consider that about 54 percent of the Flag Officers and Captains in today's Navy have graduate degrees, and a realistic conclusion is that a graduate degree, while a significant asset, is not an indispensable ticket to either promotion or assignment in the Navy.

However, study at the graduate level is an invaluable means by which to stay abreast of technological and sociological advances and to overcome the obsolescence of knowledge syndrome. Officers who have the requisite advantage of off-duty time may well wish to take advantage of the many intellectual opportunities which tuition assistance and Veterans benefits provide them.

The officer who has been selected for the graduate education chosen again follows a clear path. The officer not selected should seek additional experience in his specialty; and if an URL officer, strengthen the purely operational career pattern. All qualified URL officers must seek the ultimate payoff in the Navy profession, that of operational command.

At a somewhat later time in the career, as a Lieutenant Commander or Commander, the officer faces screening for selection for a junior service college or the Armed Forces Staff College; for executive officer or command afloat, for staff assignments in areas of personal interest, or increased experience or education. The officer may or may not be given the assignment personally though necessary for a particular career pattern, and success may or may not have been achieved in screening for the executive/command level. The male officer may have determined that his interests and special skills are sufficiently developed to request transfer to the Restricted Line, and if accepted enters a narrower professional field; thus, virtually giving up an opportunity for naval command at the highest level.

At the Lieutenant Commander-Commander level the warfare specialties of the male unrestricted line officer have become highly developed, and the subspecialty which he may have achieved by education, experience or both is becoming increasingly identifiable. The specialties of officers in the support areas have also been highly developed by this time. Assignments to large staffs, assignments in Washington, D.C., assignments to one of the senior service colleges, can become a part of the career pattern at this juncture, and again a part of the selection process to be faced. In each instance, when selection for the desired assignment does not occur, other options and other paths must be considered and the best match made between personal interests and the needs of the Service. These can continue to include off-duty education correspondence course work, or gain, in some cases, fully funded academic education where a clear match is achieved between needs and interests.

At each decision point where the officer's detailing request has been met, the educational request has been met, the interests and the assignments have matched, the path is clearer than when these matches have not occurred. At the Lieutenant Commander-Commander level, promotion attrition becomes more severe, and achievement levels or plateaus begin to take shape in career planning. It is sometimes very difficult for an officer not selected for promotion, or for the assignment sought, or the education personally felt necessary, to overcome a sense of failure at this point. It is easy to say that failure has not occurred, and it is a truism that it has not. Yet for the officer to continue as a responsible and contributing member of the naval profession an inner feeling must exist that achievement at this level is important, and that what is being accomplished is a job required by the Navy.

Since the Navy is a closed organization it cannot avoid the competition within the promotional and assignment systems. The Navy does not hire individuals at various levels of achievement or education to fill jobs that it needs filled, as is done by many other sectors of our society. It must fill these assignments by promotion and assignment from within. As the executive or policy level is reached, quite obviously there are fewer assignments available, and the attrition becomes even more severe. This happens in all of mankind's relationships with mankind. There is nothing unusual about this and there should be no stigma or sense of failure attached when an individual reaches that level of performance and contribution which is natural for him. In the military, uniforms are worn and badges of office are readily visible. To some they represent the attitudes of success or failure, since they relate directly to promotion and assignment. This makes achievement of a personal plateau more difficult to understand and, in some cases, to accept.

The officer who has succeeded in matching personal interests with Navy needs will be the officer most likely to feel complete job satisfaction. The officer who attempts to match the needs of the Navy to personal interests, where such a match does not exist, will feel frustration, and ultimately a sense of failure.

At various points the question must be asked; Whether or not he or she is still in the running? The answers come in various ways for some quite positively in terms of past fitness reports, assignment patterns, educational background and experience; for others more hesitatingly when they can detect examples where interests and needs did not always match; and for others negatively, where they can point to a career path which has not matched personal interests at all. Yet, all humanly react to these answers, some spurred on by constant encouragement, others discouraged by disappointments, others motivated to correct past errors. It is through this process that officers sometimes decide to leave the Navy, assessing their possibilities of contribution as something less than their own idea of success.

If promotional statistics are used as the criterion for success, an officer can clearly say that once selected to Commander, the odds have been beaten since the cumulative percentage promotion opportunity to Commander is about 50 percent. A male Ensign entering a naval career can realistically anticipate a 1.6 percentage opportunity for promotion to Rear Admiral. So, if promotion to Flag rank is the only criterion for a successful career, there must be an admission at the outset that the odds for achieving the success are small. Fortunately, this is not the only true criterion for success. Contribution, achievement, job satisfaction, continuing intellectual stimulation, are possible at all levels of the promotional ladder, and a naval career should be viewed in this light.

There is no absolute promotional path within the Navy, nor should there be. The officer who over the years best identifies personal interests as matching the requirements for fulfilling naval assignments, and amplifies those interests by experience and education, is the officer most likely to continue progress in a naval career. The path is competitive; there is no single criterion for achievement--not graduate degree, not particular specialty, not a specific combination of specialty and subspecialty assignments, not assignment to a service college--but a recognition that a proper blending of these

elements into a career path, results at regular intervals along that path in identifying officers who have contributed more effectively than others to the dynamic needs of the Navy. This is as true of all society as it is true of the military.

'Simply stated those who seek to serve will serve best'."

"MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF THE NAVAL OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDY

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON NAVAL OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This is in response to your letter of April 30, 1974 in which you summarized the interim results of your Naval Officer Professional Development Study and solicited my comments. Professional development as used in your study refers to the in-service formal training and education of naval officers as they progress through a naval career.

I am providing you with detailed comments on the contents of your letter. These comments vary little from those I have made over the past ten years on this subject before various congressional committees. You indicate that you have read those reports.

Before commenting in detail, I must make several observations on the broader issues involved. First, over the past 15 years I have witnessed a plethora of studies on the education of naval officers. They were all done by well-intentioned people and they have generally concluded that drastic changes are needed if the taxpayer's money is not to be squandered on useless training. These thick, well-written reports are filed away until the next study is called for. Unless and until those empowered to correct the situation are willing to take a hard and unpopular (within the service) position and force necessary changes, nothing will occur except continued studies.

Second, the task of correcting the existing situation is made almost impossible because there is no one in the Navy who is totally responsible for this area. It is too easy for the heads of various agencies in the Navy to exercise partial authority, yet offer as an excuse their inability to effect change because it is 'someone else's' responsibility.

In your letter you point out that the FY 75 budget for naval education and training is 1.7 billion dollars. From comments I have made before congressional committees, you will see that I consider the in-service training and education of naval officers is one of the most abused areas of governmental expenditure when viewed from a value received standpoint. I support any effort to get proper control over the various programs which provide this education and training. You can also see from my testimony that I approve of advanced training as a means to increase an officer's professional ability, but I do not subscribe to providing any education of training simply to enhance an individual officer's ability to compete successfully for promotion as a lure to keep him in the service, or to train him for a job outside the Navy. Unfortunately, these latter reasons for providing advanced education prevail today and I see little effort within the Navy to change them.

You indicated in your letter that your study was divided into three areas: Functional Training, Service Colleges and Post Graduate Education. My comments are divided to correspond with these areas and are summarized in the conclusion.

Functional Training

In my opinion, this is the area in which the major expenditure in time, effort, and money should be made. Specific training for a specific assignment should be used to a far greater extent in all areas because it offers the greatest direct return to the service. Nuclear power training, aviation and submarine training are examples which have been reasonably successful over the years. But, I would caution you that too often, the functional training actually given the Navy amounts to little more than superficial indoctrination courses which are neither challenging, rigorous, or useful. Functional training of this type is of little value and I do not support it.

I suspect you will find that few if any officers fail these courses, and this should prompt a skeptical appraisal of the value of this type of training. You remark in other sections of your letter that nuclear-trained officers apparently benefit professionally from their functional nuclear power training, but one point which you might consider in this regard is that the majority of the officers undergoing this training must personally exert themselves if they are to succeed in passing the courses. By doing so, they upgrade their individual capability, potential and worth to the Navy. This could be made the case in all Navy schools; doing so would have a beneficial effect on the quality of the officer corps.

Easy indoctrination courses are not the answer to increased professional development and are a waste of time, especially, if, as you say you have found, the requirements for attendance are inconsistently applied and loosely administered. I agree with your efforts to get the specific training requirements identified and followed consistently.

You should also recommend that those responsible for this training make their courses more rigorous in content and in administration. To do so, mechanisms must be established for close control of the various curricula and for the quality of the instruction. Both of these areas receive extensive attention in the nuclear power training program and I consider them fundamental to any sort of proper instruction. The gathering of all functional training data into one source document will accomplish nothing unless there is centralized responsibility for administering the courses and for assuring their quality.

Service Colleges

Service colleges are worth their expense and effort only if they develop selected high quality officers into higher quality officers ready to assume leading roles in the fleet or in the Navy Department. Your letter confirms my view that this is not the way officers are being selected, nor the courses used in this way.

You cite the inability to get top performers into the service colleges because they are in demand elsewhere. This proves minimal need of present service college instruction; your statement that service college graduates have not been consistently selected for promotion merely proves the point. Clearly these courses have been kept full by assigning less capable officers who were not in demand elsewhere. I suspect this has been done primarily to justify the service college as an institution and to give the excuse for maintaining the faculty. The results you cite with respect to promotion show that there is no way to elevate an average performer into a front-runner simply by providing him with a year's sabbatical leave at the college of his choice.

I suggest that you consider recommending that only officers with top performance records be eligible for assignment to the service colleges and, if there are not enough officers to fill a given course, then schedules should be rearranged, dropping classes where necessary. I recognize that this practice will be at cross-purposes with the ability to justify the large faculties and expensive facilities which now exist, and on that basis, I doubt it would be acceptable to the Navy.

Post Graduate Education

Post graduate education in the Navy also suffers from a lack of consideration for the needs of the service and an overabundance of concern for the desires of the individual officer. However, the degree and the effect in the post graduate area are an order of magnitude more severe. Annually, the Navy is wasting many millions of dollars and many officers by providing them with the ability to ask for more money in their job-hunting after they retire or resign. This is being done under the semblance of upgrading or developing the intellectual capability of the officer corps. The Navy could get along with 15 to 20 percent fewer officers if we stopped this non-sensical education.

You say you have trimmed the Navy's requirements for officers with advanced degrees back from just over 6000 to about 5100. In my opinion 5100 is still an order of magnitude too many. I have never seen the need for any naval officer to have a doctoral degree, regardless of his area of specialization, and I have spoken out consistently against it; but I note that some 168 PhD's were on active duty as of 1 January of this year. I suspect your investigation will show many more currently in training. There is no possible way that such extravagance and mis-use of officers can be justified.

You should take another hard look at the requirements for post graduate degrees, even at the masters level. I suggest you determine who sets the requirements for the degrees and whether or not the justifications are valid. I am sure you will find that in many cases the requirement was stated by an incumbent who was more interested in justifying his own educational achievement than by one who really knew the job and made an objective analysis of the credentials needed to fill it.

I agree with recognition of education beyond the baccalaureate level and below the masters level, but I believe this recognition already exists. Officers in this category have obviously recognized the requirement to develop themselves further and have done so on their own time without the promise of a gilt-edged degree to sue for their later benefit. More likely than not, an officer inclined to develop himself is a strong performer professionally, and is ahead of his group in that area. The rigorous functional training that I urged above falls well into this category.

I can see no reason why the presence or absence of an advanced degree is used to differentiate between officers for selection. Selection criteria should be based on performance, and performance alone.

You are correct in your assessment of my remarks before congress that I agree with post graduate education for a limited number of naval officers. I positively do not agree from my experience, that wholesale application of post graduate education will produce a better officer corps, and I strongly disagree with sending young officers for graduate training immediately upon commissioning. Officers should be considered for post graduate assignment only after a good seasoning period at sea and then only if they have demonstrated

that they have the necessary potential to excel. Such post graduate assignments should not be the 'right' of every officer, as is presently the case. The needs of the Navy, not the desire of the officer should be paramount. This potential for excellence need not be limited to command at sea but should also apply to other positions consistent with the needs of the Navy. There should also be good indication that officers ordered to post graduate school intend to make the Navy a career.

In the recent past, there has apparently been a problem - similar to the one you cite for service colleges - with making first-rate officers available for post graduate training. I am sure that in order to protect the institution, specifically the Monterey school, officers whose records would not otherwise support such an assignment have been used to justify its existence. I do not mean to imply that the officers assigned during this period may not possess the academic credentials, although this may well be the case, but rather that their future worth to the Navy is less than that of their contemporaries who were in greater demand at sea and in key jobs elsewhere. This practice, I feel, is indefensible on the part of the Navy and it supports a contention I have made for some time - that the Navy should give up the Monterey School and do all of its post graduate work at private colleges and universities. This proposal despite the saving of funds and the better education made available, has never been acceptable to the Navy because it means letting go of another established institution and a comfortable faculty. However, I cannot conceive of a situation where the nation's academic capacity for post graduate study would be inadequate to support the needs of the Navy. This assumes, of course, that even those needs are carefully assessed and found to be valid.

Professional development for an officer means gaining the ability to handle increasingly demanding and responsible jobs, becoming thereby of steadily increasing value to the service. Professional development through formal education alone must never be allowed to dictate promotional preference, nor should it be considered the inherent right of every officer. Conversely, professional development should be considered the responsibility of every officer and his needs and desires must be kept carefully separated. These needs and desires must be biased heavily in favor of the needs of the service. Formal education offered purely as an incentive for an extension of service commitment will surely attract precisely the opposite individual to the one desired. On the other hand, strong and well-run formal education programs must be available to assist officers to develop themselves.

Based on these views, I have the following recommendations:

- Establish clear requirements for officer functional training. Codify these requirements so as to establish centralized and responsible control over curriculum, quality of instruction and funds.
- Provide for strict quality assurance monitoring of all functional training by establishing a group or groups, separate from the naval training organization, chartered to comment critically on curriculum, quality of instruction and all other phases of the training program.
- Limit service college enrollment to top performing, high potential officers regardless of the impact on the desires of the specific officers or the ability to justify expensive teaching facilities.
- Require post graduate selection boards to select officers for post graduate school based on the need to fill specific billets, a list of which could be provided annually by the Chief of Naval Personnel. This would assure that all officers in post graduate school are earmarked for a specific assignment on completion of their schooling and that their advanced training is actually utilized.
- Phase out the Post Graduate School at Monterey, using instead, civilian institutions.

Stated simply, officer professional development must serve the Navy first and the officer second. Until this is done consistently, there can be no justification for its present high and needless cost.

/s/ H. G. RICKOVER
H. G. RICKOVER, Director
Division of Naval Reactors"